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Abstract:  This paper seeks to elucidate the distinctive nature of the rational impression on its own 
terms, asking precisely what it means for the Stoics to define logikē phantasia as an impression whose 
content is expressible in language.  I argue first that impression, generically, is direct and reflexive 
awareness of the world, the way animals get information about their surroundings.  Then, that the 
rational impression, specifically, is inherently conceptual, inferential, and linguistic, i.e. thick with 
propositional content, the way humans receive incoming information from the world.  When we 
suspend certain contemporary assumptions about propositional content, the textual evidence can be 
taken at face value to reveal why, for the Stoics, rational impressions are called thoughts (noēseis) and 
how the Stoics’ novel semantic entities called lekta (roughly, the meanings of our words) depend on 
rational impressions for their subsistence.     
 
 
At the heart of Stoic philosophy of mind is the rational impression (logikē phantasia).  As it happens, 
the Stoics think that the mind resides in the heart, but this is not what makes the Stoic account 
interesting; seating the mind in the heart is a commonplace for the time.  What sets the Stoics apart 
is their focus on mental phenomena of soul (psychē) over Aristotle’s physiological mechanisms, and 
on semantic content over Plato’s desiderative psychology — all of which begins with the rational 
impression.  Much scholarly attention has been directed to the cataleptic impression central to Stoic 
epistemology, and to the downstream functions of assent and impulse at the heart of Stoic moral 
psychology.  The rational impression itself, however, and thus the Stoic philosophy of mind proper, 
has been relatively neglected.1  This paper seeks to elucidate the distinctive nature of the rational 
impression on its own terms, asking precisely what it means for the Stoics to define logikē phantasia 
as an impression whose content is expressible in language.2 
 
First some brief background on Stoic theory.  The Stoics are well known for their robust 
corporealism:  they say that only bodies exist, or are, and they cast a large swath of reality as 
corporeal.  For example, all qualities or properties encompassed by Plato’s Forms, including even 
the virtues, and the soul itself are considered bodies.  They reason that insofar as the soul and body 																																																								
1 With the exception of Barnouw (2002). 
2 S.E., M. 8.70 (33C), passage G below; parenthetical citations like 33C refer to Long & Sedley (1987) by chapter 
(33) and order therein (C). 
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interact, and all interaction must be corporeal, the soul must itself be a body.3  Virtue is also a body, 
namely the corporeal soul disposed a certain way, or in some state, like a well-worn leather glove 
with its own patina, shape, and suppleness.4  The Stoics are also well known for saying that, while 
only bodies exist, not everything that is Something (ti, the Stoics’ highest ontological genus) exists.  
Alongside their innovatively robust category of corporeals (sōmata) that exist or are (einai, on), the 
Stoics recognized a class of incorporeal entities that subsist (huphistanai, have hupostasis); these include, 
canonically, place, void, time, and the lekta, or sayables, roughly the meanings of our words.5    Thus 
the Stoics are not brute corporealists, but sophisticated physicalists grappling with Plato’s beard.6 
 
Indeed, in order to approach the Stoics on their own terms, one must recognize how they cut across 
their predecessors’ ways of thought.  In this case, the differences between Plato, Aristotle and the 
Stoics on the philosophy of mind must be couched as a debate over the scope of physics — namely, 
whether there is a place for soul in physics.  They each give different answers to the question, How 
much can you say about the soul independent of body?  For Plato (and Descartes), the answer is (almost) 
everything, for Aristotle the answer is some, and for the Stoics it’s none.  Insofar as the Stoic soul is itself 
a body, there is no sense in which one can speak of soul without thereby speaking about body; and 
the topic of soul is squarely in the domain of physics, in stark contrast to Plato.  On the other hand, 
insofar as the Stoics also see soul as a psychic entity entirely mixed with and yet separable from a 
distinct corporeal entity (the body), the Stoics are more like Plato than Aristotle.  On this dualist 
understanding, the Stoic answer to how much can be said about soul without body is Plato’s, (almost) 
everything; in contrast to Aristotle, Stoic soul is not what unifies an animal’s body, but rather what 
gives it sensation and desire.7  
 
Soul 
I will begin by saying more about the soul considered as a body. Soul is pneuma, a portion of fiery 
breath in a certain tension (tonikēn kinēsin) “moving simultaneously inwards and outwards, the 																																																								
3 Nemesius 78,7-79,2 (45C), 81,6-10 (45D). 
4 Sextus Empiricus (SE), M. 11.22-6 (60G); Stobaeus 2.70,21-71,6 (60L), 2.73,1-15 (60J); Simplicius, In Ar. Cat. 
212,12-213,1 (28N). 
5 Alexander, In Ar. Top. 301,19-25 (27B); SE, M. 1.17 (27C); Galen, Meth. med. 10.155,1-8 (27G).  I will often 
transliterate Greek terms to avoid awkward English, here lekton (singular) and lekta (plural); alternate translations of 
lekton include what is said, what is meant, thing said, articulable, meaning. 
6 cf. de Harven (2015) and Vogt (2009). 
7 Annas (1992, p.50-56) and Long (1999, p.564, 1982, p.34-36, & 44, contra Bonhoffer and Pohlenz).   
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outward movement producing quantities and qualities, and the inward one unity and substance” 
(Nemesius 70,6-71,4 (47J)). The cosmos is pervaded by pneuma as the immanent divine guiding 
principle, and each body is what it is in virtue of the particular state of rarity and tension of the 
portion of that pneuma that constitutes it.  The Stoic scala naturae is a function of increasing 
complexity and unity due to the state of a body’s pneuma.8  A stone, for example, is a solid object that 
holds together in virtue of the tenor (hexis) of its pneuma acting on its matter.  Plants are alive and are 
said to have physique (phusis) because their pneuma is more rarefied and in a greater state of tension 
than mere hexis; plants are therefore more complex entities than stones in that the tension of their 
pneuma is an internal principle of motion and rest rather than of mere unity.  Finally, the pneuma in 
animals is yet more rarefied and complex, and is called psychē because the internal principle of 
motion and rest includes the capacity for impression and impulse.  Thus, from the standpoint of 
Stoic physics, soul is a body insofar as it is pneuma in a certain state of tension.9   
 
The soul’s corporeality can also be considered from a metaphysical standpoint, in terms of the so-
called Stoic categories:  substrate (hupokeimenon), qualified individual (poion), disposed individual (pōs 
echon), and relatively disposed individual (pros ti pōs echon).10  According to the Stoics, a complete 
analysis of any body makes reference to all four of these metaphysical aspects.  Applying this four-
fold analysis to soul, we can see that (1) soul qua substrate is pneuma; (2) each particular soul is a poion 
because its pneuma is in a state of tension such as to constitute an individual soul with certain 
qualities, characteristics and abilities; (3) the pōs echon is that individual soul in a certain state, literally 
being in a certain way — this is how the Stoics corporealize the virtues that flummoxed their materialist 
predecessors, and how they corporealize our thoughts.  Virtue for the Stoics is a stable state of 
character by which you see the world aright; it is a pōs echon because it is a habituated state of the 
poion.  Impressions, though they are temporary and fleeting, fall into this category as well because an 
impression just is the soul undergoing a pathos, i.e. being affected in some way and thus in a certain 
state. (4) Finally, every soul also lies in a determinate relation to its immediate surroundings and, 
ultimately, to the cosmos as a prior whole, so it is relatively disposed.11   
																																																								
8 Annas (1992, p.51, 50-56). 
9 Nemesius 291,1-6 (53O); Philo, Leg. alleg. 1.30 (53P), 2.22-3 (47P); Hierocles 1.5-33, 4.38-53 (53B); Galen, Intr. 
(47N). 
10 I follow Long & Sedley in describing these as metaphysical aspects under which an object can be considered, 
although I am not entirely satisfied with the term; cf. Menn (1999), Rist (1969), Sedley (1982), and Sorabji (1988). 
11 The Stoics are interestingly comparable to priority monists as in Schaffer (2010). 
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Now, the Stoics recognized two senses of the term soul, or psuchē, (a) the corporeal entity as a whole 
that is mixed through and through with body, sustaining the composite animal, and (b) the 
commanding faculty (hēgemonikon, and sometimes kurieuon), which is the highest part of soul.12   We 
have been considering soul in the first sense; the second sense refers to the hēgemonikon, the part by 
which an animal is aware of and engaged with itself and its surroundings — the locus of 
impressions. We turn now to this second sense of soul and thus to Stoic psychology and the 
philosophy of mind proper.  The Stoics famously liken the soul to an octopus, with the 
commanding faculty located in the region of the heart, and seven other parts growing out from it 
and stretching into the body.  Five of these parts are the senses, e.g. sight is pneuma that extends 
from the commanding faculty to the eyes.  The other two are the reproductive faculty, or seed 
(sperma), extending from the commanding faculty to the genitals; and, in a deeply innovative move 
whose implications are at the heart of this paper, voice (phonē), extending from the commanding 
faculty of soul to the windpipe and tongue.13 Again, what is characteristic of soul, in contrast to the 
mere phusis of plants, is that it has impression and impulse (hormē); these psychic functions make an 
animal aware of the world, and able to interact with it.  Phantasia and hormē are in effect the input 
and output faculties of the hēgemonikon, a stimulus-response mechanism presupposing a single 
subject or self that thinks and acts.14   
 
Phantasia , generically 
We turn now to the Stoic account of phantasia considered generically, as the animal’s input 
function.15  Starting from Aetius’ testimony about Chrysippus, below, I will argue that phantasiai are 
states of direct, reflexive awareness of the world. 
 
																																																								
12 SE, M. 7.232, 7.234 (53F); Calcidius 220 (53G); Annas (1992, p.63); Long (1982, p.239). 
13 Aetius 4.21.1-4 (53H); Calcidius 220 (53G); SE, M. 7.157 (passage B); Long (1982, p.51); Sedley (1993, p.330-
31). 
14 For the relevant notion of self see Annas (1992, p.58-59, & 64), Inwood (1984, p.162-64), and Long (1991, p.107, 
& 1999), all of which I take to be compatible with cautions from Gill (2006)   
15 This vexed term has been translated many different ways, as appearance, image, representation, presentation, 
perception, impression, and others.  Although I will often transliterate phantasia (singular) and phantasiai (plural), I 
have chosen impression as the most phenomenologically neutral translation, which also captures the literalness of 
the impact of the world on soul and aptly conjures the empiricism of the modern era. 
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A. (1) (a) On the one hand, impression (phantasia) is an affection (pathos) coming 
about in the soul, revealing (endeiknumenon) itself and what has made it (to pepoiēkos); 
for example, whenever through sight (dia opseōs) we observe (theōrōmen) what is white 
(to leukon), an affection is what has been engendered in the soul through seeing (dia 
horaseōs).  (b) And it is according to this impression (<kata> touto to pathos) that we 
are able to say that something white stands behind the motion in us (hupokeitai kinoun 
hēmas); and likewise, too, through touch and smell. (c) The impression is so-called 
from light; for just as light reveals (deiknusi) itself and the other things in its compass 
(periechomena), also impression reveals itself and what has made it.  (2) On the other 
hand, an impressor (phantaston) is what produces an impression; for example, what is 
white, and what is cold, and everything able to move (ho ti an dunētai kinein) the soul, 
this is an impressor. (4.12.1-5 (39B))16  
 
The faculty of phantasia is defined in A1a as affection revealing itself and what has made it, then 
illustrated by the paradigm case of seeing. Speaking generally, the work of phantasia is to receive 
information from the world, be impressed by it and produce particular impressions, or states of 
awareness in reaction to impressors that move the soul. Speaking more technically, phantasia is a state 
of awareness, in contrast to the raw sensory data before it reaches the mind.  The language of 
observing something white through sight reflects this distinction, between the senses considered as arms of 
the octopus (through sight), and the awareness that takes place only at the hēgemonikon (observing).17  I 
will make use of this distinction in my analysis with the terms sensing and sensation to refer to what 
takes place in the arms of the octopus and the sense organs (what is through sight and through seeing), 
perceiving and perception to refer to the impression that takes place in the hēgemonikon (when we observe), 
and sense-perception for sensory impressions specifically, as opposed to non-sensory impressions 
“obtained through thought (dianoia), like those of the incorporeals and of other things acquired by 
reason” (D.L. 7.51 (39A4).18  The difference between sensation and perception lies in the animal’s 																																																								
16 This is part of a four-fold analysis comparing phantasia and its objects, impressors, with imagination and its 
objects, apparitions. 
17 Galen, PHP 2.5.35-36 (de Lacy); Aetius 4.23.1 (53M); Hierocles 4.38-53 (53B5-9); cf. Long (1982, p.47-48, & 
95-97) and Annas (1992, p.62-63, & 85) for comparison to the brain and central nervous system. 
18 The account I give will proceed in terms of sensory impressions and often just in terms of vision, which are the 
paradigm cases of impression, but everything I say is meant to be applicable to non-sensory impressions as well, 
with the soul acting as corporeal agent to generate the pathos by being impressed in relation to (epi) things with a 
nature like the incorporeals (what is intelligible, vs. sensible), as reported in SE, M. 8.409 (27E). 
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awareness of the impressor’s information:  the motion that carries raw sensory data from the organ 
to the hēgemonikon is not something the animal is aware of; the imprint it makes on the hēgemonikon, 
however, must be a case of awareness — given the psychic nature of the hēgemonikon its affections 
can’t fail to be cases of awareness.  This is the force of defining phantasia in A1a as pathos revealing 
itself and what has made it; revealing is awareness.  A1b then confirms that phantasia gives us 
cognitive access to the impressor that moved it, enabling us to say things about it.  And A1c 
elucidates the reflexive dimension.  I will take each in turn.   
 
We can get a little clearer on our cognitive access to the impressor by looking at the mechanics of 
perception.   The importance of impression understood as a corporeal pathos must not be 
underestimated; herein lies the transfer of information from impressor to soul. 
 
B. They [the Stoics] say there are eight parts of soul:  the five senses, the principles 
of procreation, the vocal faculty (phonētikon), and the reasoning faculty (logistikon) [i.e. 
the hēgemonikon].  Seeing is when the light between sight and what stands behind it 
(tou hupokeimenou) [the visual impressor, cf. A2] is stretched in the form of a cone … 
The conical portion of air comes to be at the point of the eye, while the base is at 
what is seen; thus the thing seen is reported through the stretched air, like a walking 
stick. (DL 7.157 (53N+)) 
 
The comparison to a walking stick illustrates that air is no less direct and corporeal a conduit to the 
hēgemonikon than a walking stick; both are conveying their information by touching. So even though 
the object of sight does not itself touch the eye, seeing remains direct in that the object moves the 
eyes via the medium of air, and the eyes convey that very motion to the hēgemonikon. The air and the 
walking stick are conduits but not intermediaries; and so too the portions of pneuma extending 
between hēgemonikon and sense organs are conduits, but not intermediaries.  Crucially, neither is any 
particular phantasia an intermediary between the world and the person perceiving it, because the 
phantasia is nothing but a temporary state of the commanding faculty receiving it.   
 
So, when an impressor strikes the senses it makes an impact that imparts information about itself to 
the sense organs, and when that motion reaches the hēgemonikon, the animal is aware of the 
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impressor.  The details of impact and transfer of information are hazy at best. However, we do 
know the Stoics embrace an analogy with wax being stamped and impressed to capture all the 
idiosyncrasies of a signet ring.19  Crucially, the Stoics are not comparing the hēgemonikon itself with 
wax, but rather comparing the wax’s taking on of all the ring’s idiosyncrasies with the hēgemonikon’s 
taking on all of its impressors’ idiosyncrasies.20  Thus the mechanism by which the wax and soul take 
on their impressors’ qualities is not the explicit point of comparison, and their being similarly 
sensitive to their impressors does not entail that the hēgemonikon is itself like wax in any further 
respect, nor that impressions are pictorial or imagistic in any literal way.  Although the details of the 
mechanism elude us, it is clear that there is a direct transfer of information when the impressor 
strikes the sense organs, creating a motion in the soul that carries the information imprinted on it to 
the hēgemonikon, where it becomes a pathos revealing what has made it.21    
 
Now we will turn to the reflexive dimension of phantasia revealing itself as well its impressor, 
illustrated in A1c in analogy with light revealing itself and what is in its compass. What is salient in 
the analogy is that light and phantasia both serve to reveal things, themselves and their objects.  In the 
case of light, revealing is obviously to be understood as illumination, making things visible, so at face 
value the Stoics have said that light makes itself visible alongside the objects it illuminates.  In the 
case of impression, revealing is to be understood as making aware, giving cognitive access to; so the 
analogy taken on its own terms dictates just that phantasia makes an animal aware of itself alongside 
its impressor.22  Sextus Empiricus even makes it explicit that there are two things being grasped in 
phantasia:  “one is the alteration itself, this is the phantasia; and the second is what made the alteration, 
and this is what is visible” (M. 7.162). What sense can we make of this self-awareness?  To begin 
with, we can say with A.A. Long (1982, p.47) that having an impression involves awareness of 
oneself as the locus of that impression. This reflexive dimension of phantasia is a natural extension of 
																																																								
19 SE, M. 7.251 (40E3). 
20 As Chrysippus’ resistance to overextending the analogy confirms, DL 7.50 (39A3). 
21 Cf. Inwood (1984, p.161-64) and Sedley (1993, p.330-31) for confirmation that no gap is possible between body 
and soul. 
22 Note that the causal direction is reversed in these two cases: light makes itself and the things it illuminates visible, 
but phantasia does not make the world intelligible; this difference does not undermine, but rather reinforces what is 
salient in the analogy. 
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an animal’s self-perception present from birth.23  Hierocles’ Elements of Ethics is an important source 
of information about self-perception in the Stoic school, and here is how he puts it: 
 
C. (1) Since an animal is a composite (suntheton) of body and soul, and (2) both of 
these are tangible (thikta) and impressible (prosblēta) and of course subject to 
resistance (prosereisei), and also (3) blended through and through (di’ holōn kekratai), 
and (4) one of them is a sensory faculty (dunamis aisthētikon) which itself undergoes 
movement in the way we have indicated, it is evident that an animal perceives itself 
continuously.  For (5) by stretching out and relaxing, the soul strikes against 
(prosballei) all the body’s parts, since it is blended with them all, and (6) in striking 
against the body it receives a striking in response.  For the body, just like the soul, 
offers resistance (antibatikon); and the affection (pathos) that results (apoteleitai) is a 
joint pressure (sunereistikon) and resistance (antereistikon) in common (homou).  (7) 
From the outermost parts, inclining in, it [sc. the pathos] travels … to the 
commanding faculty (hēgemonikon), with the result that there is an apprehension 
(antilēpsin) of all the body’s parts as well as the soul’s.  This is equivalent to the 
animal perceiving (aisthanesthai) itself. (4.38-53 (53B5-9)) 
 
Self-perception is defined as an affection in the soul, an inherently psychic pathos of the hēgemonikon, 
resulting from the reciprocal pressure of body and soul.  The reciprocal nature of this pathos is what 
makes the impression reveal both itself and the impressor, two things.  As Hierocles explains, (1) the 
body and soul are in contact; and (2) being corporeal, they can touch as agents, be impressed as 
patients, and in so doing offer resistance to each other.  Thus (6) the soul strikes the body and 
thereby receives a blow in response, and the result is a single but joint event or activity shared by 
agent and patient. This much follows just from body and soul being in contact, as described in (1) 
and (2).  The conclusion (7), that self-perception is apprehension of all the parts of body and soul, 
requires additional premises.  Premises (3) and (5) establish blending as the kind of contact in 
question, which yields the all of the conclusion; if soul and body were not in contact by total 
blending, there would be awareness of only the parts that make contact (as in an ordinary case of 
perception, where the impressor is an external object of perception). And Hierocles confirms this 																																																								
23 Seneca, Ep. 121.6-15 (57B), Hierocles 1.34-9, 51-7, 2.1-9 (57C); cf. Long (1982 & 1991, p.107) on self-
perception, and (1993, p.96) for a comparison of self-perception to proprioception. 
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reading (at 4.4-11) when he tells us that blending is responsible for the joint affect (sumpatheia) being 
total for both body and soul (but not for its being joint). Premise (4) then secures that the joint pathos 
is a case of apprehension, i.e. awareness; because the patient is a sensory faculty (psychic by nature), its 
pathos is eo ipso a case of awareness.24   More from Hierocles: 
 
D. For in general the apprehension (antilēpsis) of something external is not 
completed (sunteleitai) apart from perception of itself; for in common with (meta) 
perception of what is white, it bears saying (phere epein) that we also perceive 
ourselves being whitened (leukainomenōn) … with the result that since in all cases 
straight from birth the animal perceives something, and perception of something else 
is naturally conjoined (sumpephuken) with perception of itself, it is clear that from the 
start animals perceive themselves. (6.3-10; cf. 6.17-22) 
 
This passage makes clear that an impression requires for its completion a perception of the animal 
itself as undergoing something — it is not an impression without a reflexive component.  And 
because self-perception in the sense of continuous self-awareness is itself a state of the rational soul, 
i.e. the patient of the striking, that self-perception is conjoined with the incoming information from 
the impressor.  Just as the psychic nature of the hēgemonikon means its affections are cases of 
awareness, so too the hēgemonikon’s state of continuous self-perception makes its impressions 
reflexive.  The preposition meta indicates the closeness of this relationship, echoing the force of 
sumpephuken, literally grown together, and sunereistikon in C6.  So, while the impression is itself a second 
object of awareness alongside its impressor, the reflexive story is rather more nuanced than this.  In 
the logical analysis of impression, there is only one impressor; but in the physical and psychological 
analysis, the hēgemonikon is aware of two things jointly: the impressor in relation to the self that is 
perceiving it.  The impressor is the agent and hence the proper impressor, but the pathos is a joint 
product (sumpatheia) of agent and patient: impressor and soul together.  The reflexive role of 
impression revealing itself is thus not to be confused with the role of direct impressor.   
 
Nevertheless, the self, i.e. the animal’s constitution or articulation, can serve as an impressor in its 
own right; in that case, the reflexive element remains in play and the story is no different.  The 																																																								
24 Thus Reed (2002) cannot be right in relegating the impression to a bodily precondition for awareness and thought, 
something we are aware of only indirectly via the impressor. 
	10	
animal perceives itself as impressor, e.g. by flapping its wings and focusing on how its wings or legs 
work, and in so doing has an impression that is a joint product of impressor (self) and impression 
(also self).25  It is aware of the self in relation to itself:  this is my constitution, these are my parts and 
their functions…this is my impression.  Thus there are two senses of self-perception in play for the 
Stoics.  First, the continuous joint pathos that is a contributing cause to every impression; this is the 
reflexive element of phantasia.  Second, self-perception with the self (the animal’s present 
constitution and articulation) in the role of impressor, conjoined with the reflexive element.  Note 
that neither sense of self-perception entails that the world is revealed through phantasia as an 
intermediate entity.  The animal is directly aware of two things in relation to each other, not one via 
the other. Thus phantasia is best characterized as direct, reflexive awareness of the world.   
 
Phantasia log ikē, the rational impression 
Thus far I have avoided using the term content, usually speaking in terms of information that is 
conveyed, but it should be clear from my analysis that I take impressions to be quite content-ful.  
Indeed, insofar as an impression is a state of awareness, it is characterized precisely by its content — 
what is impressed.  As we turn to the nature of the rational impression specifically, content will be 
front and center. The question now will be:  in what does the content of the uniquely human rational 
impression consist? The short answer is that rational impressions have content expressible in words 
or language. What makes our utterances language, as opposed to mere vocal sound, is that they are 
significant (sēmantikē), and what is signified by the speaker and grasped by the rational hearer is a 
lekton.26  As we will see, lekta are inextricable from rational impressions.  The question then will be:  
what is the relation between rational impressions and lekta?  We will begin with some passages 
describing the rational impression unique to humans. 
 
E. Further, among impressions, there are those that are rational (logikai) and those 
that are irrational (alogoi); and rational are those of the rational animals, while 
irrational are those of the irrational.  Thus rational impressions are called thoughts 
(noēseis), while the irrational ones don’t happen to have a name.  And there are those 
that are expert and those that are inexpert; at any rate (goun), a statue (eikōn) is viewed 
																																																								
25 Hierocles 6.50-7.9, where the self is even described as an aisthēton, an object of sense-perception. 
26 SE, M. 8.11-12 (33B); DL 7.57 (33A). 
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one way by an expert and another way by a non-expert. (DL 7.51 (39A6-7); cf. 
Galen, Def. med (SVF 2.89)) 
 
F. For the impression arises first (proēgeitai), and then thought, which has the power 
of speaking out (eith’ hē dianoia eklalētikē huparchousa), expresses (ekpherei) in language 
(logo(i)) what it undergoes by (ho paschei hupo) the impression. (DL 7.49 (39A2/33D)) 
 
G. They [sc. the Stoics] say that the lekton is what subsists (to huphistamenon) according 
to (kata) a rational impression (logikē phantasia), and a rational impression is one in 
which the content of the impression (to phantasthen) is expressible (esti parastēsai) in 
language (logo(i)). (SE, M. 8.70 (33C); cf. DL 7.63 (33F)) 
 
This sequence of passages shows that what is characteristic of humans is the rationality of their 
impressions, and that impressions are rational when they are thoughts whose contents can be 
expressed in words or language. One might even frame these passages as a syllogism: rational 
impressions are thoughts (E); thought is linguistic and semantic (F); therefore lekta (the Stoics’ 
linguistic and semantic entities) subsist according to thought, the rational impression (G).  Now, this 
much is uncontroversial, but only because it does not yet take a stand on what it means for the lekton 
to subsist according to, or kata, the rational impression (cf. A1b). Everyone agrees that lekta are the 
expressible content of rational impressions, but there is an important disagreement as to whether the 
lekta give otherwise semantically empty impressions their propositional content, or whether lekta 
owe their propositional content to the rational impressions according to which they subsist.  We can 
sloganize the debate by asking whether rational impressions are conduits or causes of lekta.27   
 
I avoided operating in terms of content because the term is laden with interpretive baggage, which it 
is now time to lay bare.  The most basic presupposition about mental content is that it is 
propositional.  This by itself says little, since everything hangs on what it means to be propositional; 
so let’s accept it and see what comes out with different senses of propositional.  One sense is 
practically axiomatic in the literature: to be propositional is to have content that is all and only from 
lekta construed as mind-independent entities, i.e. propositional content comes from thought 																																																								
27 I do not intend the word cause in the technical Stoic sense, which requires all causes to be capable of action and 
passion; by cause I mean source, or grounding body. 
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grasping propositions.28  It is a corollary of this view that sense-perception reports only bare sensory 
qualities (e.g. colors, shapes and sounds), which are not part of the propositional content, on the 
model of the wooden horse in Plato’s Theaetetus (184-186).   If all content comes from lekta, 
whatever else there is (including the sensory information from the wooden horse), it doesn’t count 
as content.  It is also a corollary of the view, that sense-perceptions are objects or inputs for reason 
construed as something distinct; the mind that thinks is aware of phantasiai as its objects.  Since 
reason is what distinguishes humans from animals, it must be some part of soul in addition to the 
faculty of impression they have in common.   
 
This picture first took hold with William and Martha Kneale, Jan Łukasiewicz, and Benson Mates 
who brought much insight and attention to Stoic logic in the mid-20th century.  The philosophical 
currency of propositions is established there by reference to Frege, Carnap, Quine, Church, and 
others.29  The lekton is thereby taken to be an independent semantic entity that gives our subjective 
and private thoughts their objective semantic content.  Call this the de-psychologizing orthodoxy.  
Michael Frede, who did much to establish this picture as the orthodoxy, takes the view that 
impressions are the way that a lekton is perceived, but of themselves have no propositional content 
(see Frede 1987, p.156). This assumption that all semantic content is from lekta, plays out in an 
ongoing debate over the status of non-rational impressions in animals and children.  This debate is 
thought to be instructive on an Aristotelian-style assumption that since animals and humans have 
impression in common, their impressions must be the same (on the wooden horse model, corollary 
one) and reason must be something further receiving those impressions (corollary two).  So if we 
can get clear on what goes in animals and children, we’ll know about the added ingredient of reason 
as well.30  The problem facing the orthodox view is that if all mental content is propositional and 
conceptual, then it looks like animals and children (since they are classified as irrational) cannot have 
mental contents, only the bare sensory qualities of the wooden horse; but these are not sufficient to 
explain complex animal behavior.  Thus one solution is to say that content can be propositional 
without being conceptual, in which case children and animals can have articulable mental contents 
																																																								
28 Cf. Brittain (2002) as the notable exception to Annas (1992), Barnes (1993, 1999), Caston (1999, unpublished), 
Frede (1987), Inwood (1985), Lesses (1998), Mates (1961), Sedley (1993), and Sorabji (1990). 
29 Mates (1961, p.19-26). 
30 Cf. Brittain (2002, p.256-57) and Lesses (1998, p.1-3) for perspicuous summaries of the issues. 
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sufficient to explain behavior without having to grasp that content.31  This is an unfortunate choice:  
either animals and children have mental content without being able to grasp it, or they have no 
mental content at all.   My suggestion is that this is a false dichotomy resting on the mistaken axiom 
and corollaries of the de-psychologizing orthodoxy.  So, I propose to suspend the axiom that 
semantic content only comes from lekta and see where it leads when we take our inquiry to the texts 
and read the Stoics on their own terms.  We will begin with Sextus.  
 
H. They say that the human does not differ from irrational animals in respect of 
uttered speech (prophoriko(i) logo(i)) (for crows and parrots and jays utter articulate 
sounds), but in respect of internal speech (endiatheto(i)), nor merely by the simple 
impression (for these too have impressions) but by the transitive (metabatikē(i)) and 
synthetic (sunthetikē(i)) impression.  Wherefore (dioper), having the conception of 
implication (akolouthias ennoian exōn), straightaway one also grasps the thought of a 
sign, through implication; for, that is, the sign itself is such: “if this, then that.”  
Therefore the fact that there are signs also (to kai sēmeion huparchein) follows from 
(hepetai) the nature and constitution (kataskeuē(i)) of the human being. (SE, M. 8.275-
6 (53T); cf. M. 8.285, PH 1.65) 
 
Sextus reports that humans differ from animals in two ways:  internal speech and rational 
impressions.  First, it’s not the actual proffering of speech that makes us different from animals, but 
endiathetos logos, which we can think of as the ability to make statements to oneself.32  This gap 
between impression and utterance where internal discourse takes place is what gives us the uniquely 
human control over assent and impulse, in contrast to blue jays that utter articulate cries as an 
automatic response to their impressions.33  Origen confirms this picture when he reports that the 
rational animal “has reason that passes judgment on impressions (logon…ton krinonta tas phantasias)), 
rejecting some of these and accepting others, in order that the animal may be guided according to 
them [sc. those they accept]” (Princ. 3.1.3 (53A5); cf. Calcidius 220 (53G)).  Passing judgment on 																																																								
31 As Caston (unpublished) and Sorabji (1990) suggest; note here the seeds of epistemic externalism, which is a 
related orthodoxy established by Annas (1990), Frede (1987), Striker (1974); cf. Nawar (2014) and Perin (2005) for 
recent defenses of internalism. 
32 As Long (1971, p.88) puts it; cf. Gourinat (2013) for additional texts and valuable cautions against assimilating 
Stoic endiathetos logos to the Platonic notion more akin to internal dialogue than declamation (diexodos). 
33 This point may be put either in terms of denying assent to animals and introducing it only with humans, or 
granting animals assent but calling it voluntary only with humans; cf. Brittain (2002, p.257, n. 10). 
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impressions does not signal that the mind takes impressions as its objects on a wooden horse model, 
but rather that there is a gap between perception and assent where reflection and deliberation take 
place.  This is self-perception in the second sense described above, not merely reflexive but with the 
self in the role of impressor.  Indeed, examination of our impressions is the most important kind of 
self-perception because it is for the sake of evaluating the way we see the world, analyzing our 
seeings as before owning them with our assent.  In this gap we have the opportunity to evaluate and 
examine our impressions before passing judgment, choosing the lekton we assent to and becoming 
responsible for the resulting impulse and action.  Epictetus calls it parakolouthia and even personifies 
the process for rhetorical effect:  “Wait for me a bit, phantasia; let me see who you are and what are 
about, let me test you” (Diss. 2.18.24-6). Given this gap between impression and assent, there must 
be something about the rational impression that makes it available for this kind of examination prior 
to assenting to a lekton.  
 
And this is precisely the other thing differentiating us from animals:  because impressions are 
rational they can be examined and evaluated.  Sextus explains that our impressions are transitive, 
literally moving from one place to another (metabatikē), and constructive or compositional 
(synthetikē).  We can capture this point by saying they are discursive:  being metabatikē signals that 
rational impressions are inferential, and being synthetikē signals that they are compositional — they 
are seeings as (as I will put it).34  And this is to say that rational impressions are conceptual and thus 
propositional.   To see something as F is to predicate a concept of it; and since Stoic concepts are 
analyzed as conditionals, seeing as is inherently inferential.35   The rational impression, being 
discursive, thus looks quite content-ful, with precisely the kind of content whose implications can be 
evaluated and selected for assent or rejection.  Here we see how the rational impression is at the 
heart of Stoic moral psychology, as the foundation of oikeisos and prohairesis, and the lynchpin of their 
compatibilist ethics, as the one thing in the cosmos over which we have control.  So, to summarize, 
the content of the rational impression is inherently inferential, conceptual, semantic, and linguistic 
— i.e. propositional.36  Thus, with the benefit of passage H, we see an alternative sense of 
propositional emerging, which does not make reference to propositions grasped as independent 																																																								
34 As Bury (1935) translates, they are transitive and constructive; cf. also Long (1971, p.87 and n. 54).  For synthesis 
as combination, see DL 7.53; SE, M. 8.60; Cicero, Fin. 3.33-34 (60D) 
35 SE, M. 11.8-11 (30I); this paraphrasing move is how the Stoics eliminate concepts from the ontology (cf. Caston 
(1999)). 
36 I will now use these terms interchangeably — with the axiom suspended, priority among them is not material. 
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objects of thought.37  We see an alternative axiom emerging as well:  the content of the rational 
impression is in the impression.  That’s why they are called thoughts (E).   
 
With the help of Cicero’s Acad. 2.21, we can also see an alternative to the first corollary, the wooden 
horse model of perception.  This passage has been of interest in the animal minds debate, as a sort 
of loophole to ascribe enough content to animals to account for their behavior without giving them 
full-fledged rationality.  But with the axiom that mental content comes all and only from lekta 
suspended, there is no reason to seek this loophole.  Denying lekta to animals need not deny them 
any mental content whatsoever, nor does it give any reason to think that sense-impressions merely 
provide raw sensory data. 
 
I. Those characteristics that belong to those things we say are perceived (percipi) by 
the senses (sensibus) are equally characteristic of that further set of things said to be 
perceived not by the senses themselves (ipsis) but by them in a certain respect 
(quodam modo), e.g. “That is white,” “This is sweet,” “That is melodious,” “This is 
fragrant,” “This is bitter.”  We have comprehension (tenemus conprehensa) of these by 
the mind now (animo iam), not the senses.  Next (deinceps), “That is a horse,” “That is 
a dog.”  The rest of the series follows next, connecting greater things that are as if to 
encompass a complete comprehension of things:  “If it is a human, it is a mortal, 
rational animal.”  From this class [sc. of things perceived by the mind] conceptions 
(notitiae) of things are imprinted (imprimuntur) on us, without which there can be no 
understanding (intellegi) nor discussion (disputari) of anything (quicquam). (Cicero, Acad. 
2.21 (39C))  
 
Those things perceived by the senses themselves are colors, tastes and sounds et al. that get 
communicated to the soul by the sense organs; this is the raw sensory data.  These colors, tastes and 
sounds are equally characteristic of, i.e. still present when those things are registered by the senses in a 
certain respect, i.e. predicatively, as white, sweet or melodious.  The idea here is that the sensory 
content delivered by the arms of the octopus persists and in that respect is equally characteristic of 
the content of the impression when it strikes the hēgemonikon and is seen as F.  The force of saying 
these are comprehended by the mind now is to signal the awareness that takes place once the sensory 																																																								
37 I take this sense to be akin to Brittain (2002) and Lesses (1998). 
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impact reaches the hēgemonikon from the arms of the octopus — the mind, but not the walking stick 
will be aware of the impressor as F.  So much is confirmed by Sextus: “for what grasps the truth in 
those things underlying (hupokeimenois) [sc. the impressors, A1b] must not only be moved in a white 
manner (leukantikōs) or a sweet manner (glukantikōs), but also be led (achthēnai) to an impression of 
such a thing that “This is white” and “This is sweet”” (M. 7.344, cf. 7.293).  Sextus goes on to 
confirm that this is no longer the job of sense because sense grasps only color, flavor and sound, but 
cannot grasp “This is white.”  Thus I take the idea that the mind grasps what the senses offer in a 
certain respect to indicate that rational impressions are inherently conceptual, echoing Sextus’ 
description of them as synthetic and inferential.  I do not find the wooden horse model in this 
passage, taking impressions to report only bare sensory qualities to thought as something distinct.  
Rather, taking the testimony that rational impressions are thoughts (E) at face value, I find the 
alternative corollary that impressions are inherently conceptual states of mind, which I have 
sloganized as: all seeing is seeing as.    
 
An alternative to the second corollary that mind, or thought is something distinct that takes 
impressions as its inputs, is also discernible in Cicero’s testimony.  This passage is in fact describing 
the Stoics’ developmental account of rationality, according to which reason is constituted by the 
concepts we acquire through experience.38  For the Stoics, humans have logos, or reason, from birth; 
it is the faculty or capacity for rationality, which develops gradually through our interactions with the 
world.  The Stoics are akin to modern empiricists in this regard, starting us with a tabula rasa “fit for 
writing upon,” and equating our rationality with the concepts we write on it.39  The initial 
development of rationality consists in our basic concept acquisition, first of preconceptions that 
arise naturally from the world, and then conceptions, which are a function of study, art and 
convention.40  Thus, in passage I we begin to get rationalized with basic sensory concepts like white, 
sweet, melodious, fragrant, and bitter; next we move to kinds like horse and dog.  Then we move 
from basic predication to connecting our concepts together and appreciating their inferential import, 
as in:  If something is a human, then it is a mortal, rational animal.  The human soul is considered rational 
once it has acquired a complete stock of concepts from experience, and a proper grasp of their 																																																								
38 Galen, PHP 5.2.49, 5.3.1 (53V). 
39 Aetius 4.11.1-4 (39E); cf. Long (1982, p.51) for whom logos is not one faculty among others, but the mode of the 
whole soul’s operation. 
40 I am in agreement with Sandbach (1930, contra Bonhoffer), that prolēpseis are not innate ideas; cf. Dyson for a 
more recent defense of such Platonizing. 
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inferential import.  Only then is a person considered to have voice, i.e. to be a reliable language user 
who understands the meanings of her words and is responsible for her actions.  Only then do our 
impressions become thoughts.  
 
It is important to appreciate the full force of this point, that impression are thoughts.  I said above 
that the psychic nature of the hēgemonikon (the kind of poion that it is) makes the impressor’s imprint 
result in a case of awareness, a pathos that reveals itself and its cause.  Further, that the state of 
continuous self-perception (the poion pōs echon) makes every impression reflexive.  Now, by that same 
token, we can appreciate that the rationalized state of the human hēgemonikon makes the pathos 
propositional in addition.  The habituated state of the hēgemonikon (pōs echon) determines how the 
incoming information is conceived, i.e. how the patient is affected. And the way the patient is 
affected is what is impressed (to phantasthen), i.e. the content of the rational impression that is 
expressible in words.  So, in answer to the first question posed in this section, in what does the 
content of the rational impression consist, the answer is this:  incoming information from the 
impressor, as it is conceived.  This is not two steps or two components, but one.  Another way to 
put my point is to say that I reject the distinction between character and content; the content of an 
impression just is the incoming information, the way it is conceived.   
 
This idea that the state or disposition of a person’s soul determines the content of the rational 
impression is confirmed by the Stoic account of expertise.  Earlier, in passage E, rational 
impressions were subdivided into expert and inexpert.  Let’s take this at face value, and ask what it 
means for a rational impression to be expert.  We know that the Stoics explicitly categorize expertise 
(e.g. having the art of medicine or, ideally, the art of life) as a tenor (hexis) of soul, and so a pōs echon.  
Further, that “expertise is a system [developed] out of (ek) cognitions (katalēpseōn) in joint training 
(sunggegumnasmenōn) relative to some goal useful in life” (Olympiodorus, In Plat. Gorg. 12.1 (42A)).41  
To be an expert, then, is to have developed one’s rationality with care and attention to some goal.  
Just as basic human rationality is constituted by the development of our preconceptions and 
conceptions from our interactions with the world, so expertise is just a further habituation or 
training of the hēgemonikon with a certain end in mind, say carpentry, medicine, or virtue (the art of 
life).  As the preposition ek signals, expertise is not a new ingredient or part of soul, but soul itself 																																																								
41 Cf. also Stobaeus 2.73,1-13 (60J); Cicero, Acad. 2.22 (42B); Plutarch, Virt. mor. 440E-441D (61B). 
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disposed in a certain way — pneuma that is maximally sensitive to the world’s maximal intelligibility 
and detail, just as the comparison with wax dictates.   
 
Julia Annas finds it puzzling that the impression itself is characterized as expert or inexpert, and 
suggests an interpretive dilemma.42  On the first model, the expert and the non-expert have the same 
phantasiai with the same content at step one, but assent to different lekta at step two because they 
only take in or accept part of the information contained in the impression.  On this picture, the 
information contained in the phantasia is raw sensory data (on the wooden horse model) and step 
two marks the introduction of conceptual or propositional content.  On the second model, the 
expert and inexpert have different phantasiai with different content, but there is no distinction to be 
made between perception and assent, only a distinction between the striking of the sense organ (step 
zero) and what happens at the hēgemonikon (step one = step two).  Annas, stumped, finds no reason 
to prefer either horn of the dilemma.  But notice that the dichotomy rests on the orthodox 
assumption that the lekton assented to contains the content of the phantasia.  If phantasiai only have 
content derivatively in virtue of grasping an external, independent lekton, experts and inexperts can 
only differ in these two ways:  either they have the same raw, non-conceptual data (same phantasiai) 
and assent subsequently to different lekta, or they have different phantasiai with different conceptual 
content and eo ipso assent to different lekta.   With the orthodoxy suspended, however, there is no 
reason to accept Annas’ dichotomy.   
 
Rather, a natural alternative emerges that takes the expert and inexpert to have different phantasiai 
with different content at step one, and sees assent (step two) as a distinct phase of cognition on the 
other side of internal discourse.  The world in all its specificity makes a causal impact (tuposis) on our 
sensory apparatus (step zero); this much is the same in everyone, expert and inexpert alike (assuming 
comparable eyesight, e.g. neither needs glasses).  Then, in analogy with the walking stick, the tuposis 
imprinted with the impressor’s information travels up the arms of the octopus to the hēgemonikon, 
where it becomes a phantasia. This is step one, and it is not the same in the expert and inexpert, 
because their souls are differently habituated and so they receive the information differently.  An 
expert soul is sensitive to more of the incoming information, capable of seeing more than the 
novice.  When an arborist looks at a certain tree, she sees a silver birch at a particular stage of its life, 
																																																								
42 1992, p.82-83. 
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in some determinate state of health, etc.  I see a tree.  When an artist looks at a painting, she sees 
scale, composition, brush strokes, media, and technique, reading the creative process off the canvas.  
I see a painting.  We see the same painting, and we have the same incoming sensory data, but we do 
not see it the same way.  As Cicero puts it just before telling us that things are perceived by the 
senses in a certain respect (Acad. 2.20):  “How many things painters see in shadows and in the 
foreground which we do not see!”  The content of an expert’s impression (the expert’s seeing as) is 
different from the non-expert’s because the expert soul is habituated by experience and art, a 
collection of inferential conceptions and maximal sensitivity to detail.  There is thus a wealth of 
content in the expert’s rational impression, which cannot be captured by any one simple lekton.  This 
is why impressions are neither objects of thought for a separate mind (corollary 2) nor reporters of 
mere sensory data on a wooden horse model (corollary 1), but thoughts about their impressor—
thick with conceptual and inferential content resulting from the impressor making an impact on the 
hēgemonikon.43 
 
Phantasia log ikē, source of l ekta  
We now turn to the second question raised above, what is the relation between the rational 
impression and the lekton?  What does the preposition kata convey when we are told that the lekton 
subsists according to the rational impression (A1b, F)?  The order of explanation in passages F and G 
already suggests that lekta depend on the rational impression:  (F) says, first we have an impression, 
then we express its content (by uttering lekta);44 (G) says, lekta subsist according to the rational 
impression, because the rational impression has the content to give them their subsistence.45  More 
concretely, in passage H after telling us that humans have internal discourse and rational 
impressions, Sextus goes on to infer (and reiterate at 8.285) that the existence of conditionals follows 
from the human nature and constitution.  Given that conditionals are composed of lekta, this 
conclusion amounts to an explicit claim that lekta depend on rational impressions as prior 
																																																								
43 Cf. Long (1991, p.109-10) who speaks of rational impressions as thick with content and potential judgments; 
Caston (unpublished) has recently called into question the thin notion of content and passive model of mind, but he 
remains committed to the orthodox axiom and thus differs only in requiring more propositions to imbue the 
impression with its full content 
44 This priority is not merely temporal; immediate context (not quoted) shows that this order explains the priority of 
rational impression to assent, knowledge and reasoning. 
45 Others in the current minority that favors mind-dependence include Barnouw (2002), Imbert (1978), Long (1971, 
1991, 1999, 2006), and Nuchelmans (1973). 
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semantically (since they have conceptual content of themselves) and ontologically (the fact that there 
are conditionals follows from the rational impression).   
 
We can add to this now the explicit testimony that lekta arise out of (ek),46 i.e. from, and in 
consequence (parhuphistamenon)47 of the rational impression.  Further, Sextus tells us at M. 8.80 that 
for the Stoics speaking (legein) is uttering voice that signifies the subject matter in mind (to tēn tou 
nooumenou pragmatos semantikē propheresthai phonēn).  Likewise, Diogenes reports that “language is 
semantic voice (phonē sēmantikē) sent forth from thought (ekpempomenē apo dianoias)” (DL 7.56; cf. 
7.55 (33H+)).  Galen also lays bare the Stoic commitment to the dependence of lekta on thought, 
quoting Zeno, Diogenes of Babylon, and Chrysippus on this point:  mind is the source of language.  
Following is the quote he attributes to Chrysippus, telling us explicitly, that words receive their 
meaning from thought. 
 
J. [16] “It is reasonable (eulogon) that that in which (eis ho) the meanings at that point 
(hai en touto(i) sēmasiai) come to be and out of which discourse (logos) comes to be, is 
the ruling (kurieuon) part of soul.  For the source (pēgē) of [internal] discourse (logos) is 
none other than thought (dianoias), and the source of voice (phōnēs) none other than 
[internal] discourse, and [i.e.] (kai) on the whole, simply, the source of voice is none 
other than the ruling part of soul … [18] For on the whole, whence (hothen) discourse 
(logos) issues must be where (ekeise) reasoning (dialogismos), thinkings (dinanoeseis) and 
preparations (meletas) of linguistic expressions (rēseiōn) come to be, just as I said.  [19] 
And these things clearly come to be around the heart, both voice and [public] 
discourse issuing from the heart through the windpipe.” (Galen, PHP 2.5.16-20)48   
 
Here is a breakdown of the passage:  (16) the commanding faculty is the where meanings and 
discourse (logos) come to be.  Why?  First, because internal discourse has its source in thought, and 																																																								
46 DL 7.43; Barnes (1993, p.56) does cop to the “lameness” of dismissing this piece of testimony as generally 
confused in order to work around the obvious language of dependence. 
47 SE, M. 8.11-12 (33B); Sryianus In Ar. meta. 105,25-30; Lloyd (1985) has argued nicely that parhuphistamenon, 
which is also used to describe the relation of the incorporeal, place, to its occupying body, signals strong 
dependence, a parasitic relation between the lekton and rational impression. 
48 Reading en touto(i) adverbially in the sense of at that point in time/place (LSJ IV),  corresponding to 
ensēmainesthai in 20, confirmed by ekeithen (thence) in 20, and hothen in 18; attributive position signals that they 
become semantic at that very point; I am grateful to David Crane for discussion of this passage. 
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voice has its source in internal discourse; therefore (simply put) voice comes from the hēgemonikon 
(where thought takes place).49  (18) Second, because the source of discourse must be (i.e. on principle) 
the place of reasoning and thinking, and where words are imbued with meaning.  Diogenes of 
Babylon confirms:  “discourse is sent forth having been imprinted (ensesēmasmenon) and in a way 
stamped (hoion ektetupōmenon) by conceptions in the mind” (Galen, PHP 2.5.12). Thus we see that the 
mind-dependence of lekta is attested by a wide variety of sources: a hostile skeptic, neutral 
doxographer, fussy Platonizing physician, and now in a grammatical context by Ammonius, head of 
the neoplatonist school in Alexandria: 
 
K. The Stoics reply [to the peripatetic] that the nominative case itself has fallen 
(peptōken) from thought (apo noēmatos), which is in the soul. For when we wish to 
reveal (dēlōsai) the thought of Socrates that we have in ourselves, we utter 
(propherometha) the name Socrates [i.e. Socrates in the nominative case]. Therefore, 
just as a pen is said both to have fallen and to have its fall upright if it is released 
from above and sticks upright, so we claim that the nominative case [literally 'the 
direct case'] falls from thought (apo tēs ennoias), but is upright because it is the 
archetype of meaningful utterance (tēs kata tēn ekphonēsin prophoras). (In Ar. De int. 
43,9-15 (33K))50 
 
Jonathan Barnes has objected to taking this (and a plethora of other texts connecting lekta with 
thoughts) as evidence of Stoic semantic theory.  He urges that passage K expresses no more than the 
commonplace that producing someone’s name is a good way of telling someone who you are 
thinking about, and cautions that “[e]ven if Ammonius in this passage is referring to the Old Stoa 
(which is not clear), and even if he is reporting Stoic views with fidelity (which cannot be taken for 
granted), nevertheless his report has nothing to do with any theory of meaning. In general, we 
should not read philosophical theories into platitudes” (Barnes 1993,p .54). As a founder of the de-
psychologizing orthodoxy, Barnes’ dogma should be taken with a grain of salt.  It’s doubtful that 																																																								
49 I disambiguate logos as internal or external, i.e. public, discourse based on context: the salient contrast is between 
discourse arising in thought, on the one hand, and voice on the other; since voice, which is clearly public, has its 
source in discourse — it must be some other kind, namely internal discourse; therefore, on the assumption that being 
a source is transitive, the source of voice is the commanding faculty, where thoughts happen meanings come to be. 
50 Translation Long & Sedley with modifications; for argument that ptoseis should be considered elements of lekta, 
alongside predicates, see M. Frede (1978); cf. Long (1971) for the opposite position. 
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Ammonius spends his time rehearsing platitudes rather than theory.  Further, his caution about 
platitudes cuts both ways, since it is equally important that we not allow philosophical theories to 
upend platitudes, in this case to upend the wealth of clear textual evidence attesting to the mind-
dependence of lekta.   
 
For example, Barnes writes off Galen’s testimony as a physiological comment about the windpipe, 
which says nothing about words receiving their meaning from thought; then he adds, even if we do 
have to read this evidence as establishing that thinking causes speaking, it’s obviously false that 
speech is caused by thought because we sometimes speak unreflectively (i.e. without thinking).  But 
the fact that we sometimes speak unreflectively is hardly a counterexample to the general claim that 
human voice is made semantic by thought.  And Barnes’ dismissal of Sextus’ testimony at 8.80 as 
telling us that voice is significant because the pragma it has in mind is just a lekton is circular: 
presupposing that rational impressions have semantic content only because they grasp independent 
lekta. The scarcity of our textual evidence makes every passage precious, so Barnes’ summary 
dismissal of a dozen different passages connecting lekta with thoughts is not to be taken lightly.  
Tossing so much evidence aside is a steep price to pay for any interpretation.51  However, my point 
is not just that the cost is too high, but that the expense is artificial.  With the axiom suspended, 
there is no need to dismiss all this textual evidence, or to fall on the horns of false dichotomies.   
 
Conclusion 
Taken on its own terms, the Stoic rational impression reveals a rich philosophy of mind driven by 
content.  The rational impression is a state of the rational mind, the human hēgemonikon rationalized 
by experience.  It gives us direct cognitive access to the world (as the image of the walking stick 
suggests), conjoined with self-perception.  Being an affection of rational soul, it is inherently 
propositional and thick with content for internal discourse.  We can now see how many ways 
rational impressions are at the heart of Stoic philosophy of mind.  First, to have a mind just is to 
have rational impressions; Stoic psychology is entirely monistic and cognitive through and through, 
paving the way to an austere Socratic intellectualism.  Second, to be subject to internal discourse is 																																																								
51 And the nonchalance of Barnes’ approach hardly makes the cost easier to bear; after summarily dismissing five 
different texts unfriendly to his view, he offers no more defense than the following imaginary exchange in a 
footnote:  “'So we should discard most of the texts which inform us about Stoic sayables?' -Yes. - 'Surely that is not 
methodologically defensible?' -Yes; it is.” 
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to be able to engage in the most important kind of self-perception, parakolouthēsis:  the ability to put 
the impressor in the role of impression to see what it tells us about ourselves. Third, for rational 
impressions to be subject to internal discourse is also to have control over our assents, actions and 
state of character, and thus to have both moral responsibility and hope for moral improvement; here 
we find the famous doctrine of oikeiosis.  Further, the fact that rational impressions are direct and 
reflexive states of awareness has implications for Stoic epistemology; it will be clear already to the 
initiated that my account of rational impressions will psychologize the cataleptic impression, in 
contrast to externalist readings that are part and parcel of the orthodoxy I have been describing.  
Finally, because rational impressions are thick with propositional content, they are the source of 
lekta: causes not conduits.  Thus we can see how the Stoic philosophy of mind reaches across ethics, 
epistemology and into logic.  To define logikē phantasia as an impression whose content can be 
expressed in words is to get to the very heart of the human mind:  we are above all the language 
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